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The effects of bank market power in short-term and long-term firm 
credit availability and investment 
This article investigates the short-term and long-term effects of bank market power 
on the availability of credit for companies, and on firm investment. Our results 
suggest that an increase in bank market power reduces firms’ credit availability 
and investment in the short-term, but firm investment recovers in the long-term. 
The economic significance of these relationships is found to be larger for SMEs 
than for other (larger) firms. 
Keywords: Bank loans, bank market power, Euler equation, firm investment rate, 
risk premium. 
Subject classification codes: G21; G31; D40 
 
1. Introduction and motivation 
A number of contributions have suggested that bank market power could reduce 
lending availability for small and medium enterprises (SMEs hereafter) (Carbó et al. 
2009, Ryan et al., 2014), reducing company size (Cetorelli 2004; Cetorelli and Strahan, 
2006), and the creation of new firms (Black and Strahan, 2002; Bonaccorsi di Patti and 
Dell’Ariccia, 2004; Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi, 2007). However, few studies have 
paid attention to how these relationships may change over time. One exception is Degryse 
et al. (2011) who suggest the existence of long-term effects of bank concentration, finding 
evidence of discontinuation in the relationship between banks and firms after the mergers. 
Other studies have concluded that bank concentration creates informational rents (Ogura, 
2010, 2012; Petersen and Rajan, 1995) which allow banks to invest specific resources in 
relationship with borrowers that may also have long-term effects (Degryse and Ongena, 
2007; Elsas, 2005; Presbitero and Zazzaro, 2011). Perhaps, the conflicting results 
suggesting a negative relationship between bank market power and firm financial 
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restrictions (and investment) in some cases, and a positive relationship in other cases, can 
be somehow reconciled analysing both a short-term and a long-term perspective. 
 In this article, we investigate the relationship between bank market power and 
firms’ credit availability and investment both in the short-run and the long-run in Spain. 
To perform our empirical analysis, we rely on a unique and representative sample 
combining firm and bank information from Bureau van Dijk’s SABI database and the 
three Spanish banking associations –AEB, CECA, and UNACC- consisting of 578,188 
observations (61,174 Spanish firms) for the period 1998-2009. We employ the Lerner 
index as a measure of bank market power. We also use Granger predictability to explore 
the direction of the relationship between bank market power and firm investment. As a 
way of preview, the main findings are the following: (i) bank market power exerts a 
negative influence on credit availability and the firm investment rate in the short run; (ii) 
The negative relationship holds in the short term but investment rate grows again in the 
long term. The results are robust when we employ alternative investment variables such 
as asset growth or investment over assets, and when the Lerner index is replaced by 
measures of bank loan concentration; (iii) the Granger predictability test shows that bank 
market power predicts firm investment, but not the opposite.  
 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the 
background for the theoretical and empirical literature on different firm investment 
methodologies and approaches to bank market structure. Section 3 presents the 
methodology. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 offers the main results. Section 6 
concludes. 
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2. Background literature 
Previous studies have highlighted the importance of the availability of bank credit 
for SMEs (Berger and Udell, 1998, 2002, 2006), and the impact of bank credit constraints 
on the access to other financial resources, such as trade credit (Fisman and Love, 2003; 
Fisman and Raturi, 2004; Petersen and Rajan, 1997). Overall, difficulties in the access to 
external finance have been shown to hamper firm growth and induce an increase in 
company liquidations (Canales and Nanda, 2012). 
 However, there are conflicting results in previous studies on the relationship 
between bank market power, firm financing constraints and, ultimately, investment.  
Some studies advocate that bank competition can have positive effects on firm financing 
(Berger, 1995; Berger and Udell, 2002; Berger and Black, 2011; Boot and Thakor, 2000; 
Carbó et al., 2009; Cetorelli and Gambera, 2001; Cetorelli, 2004; Elsas, 2005; Ogura, 
2010, 2012; Sapienza, 2002; Scott and Dunkelberg, 2003, 2010; Zarutskie, 2006)1. In this 
vein, there has been empirical evidence suggesting that bank concentration reduces firm 
access external finance, particularly in countries with poor institutional development or 
significant restrictions to financial activities  (Beck et al., 2004). These effects have been 
found to be particularly acute in the the case of SMEs (see Craig and Hardee, 2007).. 
Agostino and Trivieri (2008, 2010) show, for Italian firms, the negative effect of local 
bank market power on firms’ access to bank finance. Scott and Dunkelberg (2010) find 
that increases in bank competition improve both bank and non-bank financing 
availability. Canales and Nanda (2012) analyse the effects of bank deregulation and 
                                                 
1 Berger et al. (2004) offer an extensive overview of the effects of bank concentration on firm 
financing, particularly for the case of SME financing, and offer a future research agenda as 
well. 
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competition on the amount and price of loans offered to firms. They show that 
decentralized banks tend to lend more to firms, particularly SMEs, thereby increasing 
entrepreneurial activity. Financial institutions offer more attractive terms to firms in 
competitive environmental markets, and they are in a better position to select the 
healthiest firms and restrict credit in areas where they have the necessary market power. 
Similarly, Ryan et al. (2014) find that increased bank market power results in increased 
financial constraints for the SMEs that are more dependent on bank financing. This result 
strongly supports the market power hypothesis.  
 There are studies suggesting that bank market power may be perceived by 
financial institutions as a necessary tool to extract information from borrowers (Ogura, 
2010; Petersen and Rajan, 1994, 1995; Rajan, 1992). The seminal work of Petersen and 
Rajan (1995, 2002) concludes that banks can extract informational rents of their 
relationship with customer and lend to increasingly distant firms without compromising 
their ability to underwrite or monitor those loans. Various studies have shown ways in 
which information technology could be employed as a lending tool for the smallest firms, 
including fixed-asset lending, asset-based lending, or even credit scoring.2 Dell'Ariccia 
(2000) shows that the effect of banking competition on screening gives rise to certain 
ambiguities resulting in a prisoners’ dilemma in which banks must decide between 
relationship and transactional lending. Boot and Thakor (2000) show that bank 
competition reduces the profitability of transactional lending in relation to relationship 
lending. Thus, the authors find that the profit that each bank gains by investing in 
                                                 
2 Recent empirical papers have shown that the comparative advantage of large banks in hard 
information technologies do not appear to be monotonically increasing with firm size (see 
Berger et al., 2005a, b; Berger and Black 2011; Frame et al., 2001). 
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knowledge decreases as income increases, so the income per unit of relationship lending 
decreases. Degryse and Ongena (2001) find that profitability is higher if firms maintain 
only one bank relationship, whilst firms having relationships with more than one bank are 
generally smaller and younger than companies which do not.3 Carbó et al. (2012) show 
that firms with more intense relationships throughout their lifespan and a lower number 
of banks enjoy greater credit availability and are less likely to be credit constrained. In 
the same line, Kano et al. (2011) suggest that the bank-borrower relationship depends on 
three factors, identified by the economic literature as: verifiability of information, bank 
size and complexity, and bank competition. Based on a database of Japanese firms, the 
authors find evidence that longer relationships benefit borrowers and smaller banks in 
terms of reduced loan interest rates and credit availability, although they find that bank 
competition has little effect on the benefits derived from relationship lending. 
 As for the intensity of the relationship, some studies document the existence of a 
U-shaped relationship between market concentration and bank-firm relationships 
(Degryse and Ongena, 2007; Ogura, 2010, 2012; Ongena et al., 2012; Presbitero and 
Zazzaro, 2011). Using loan information of five major German banks, Elsas (2005) shows 
the existence of a U-shaped relationship between banking concentration in a local credit 
market and the likelihood of a relational bank-firm tie. Degryse and Ongena (2007) also 
find a U-shaped relationship between market concentration and the likelihood of bank 
branches providing bank credit. This result confirms that the non-monotonic effect of 
market concentration is robust to controls on the presence of local credit markets for 
                                                 
3 See also Goddard and Wilson (2009); Goddard et al., (2007, 2011) for a complete overview of 
New Industrial Organization approaches as profit hypotheses, as well as different 
methodological aspects. 
 
7 
banks with multiple contacts. Presbitero and Zazzaro (2011) extend their analysis by 
suggesting that this non-monotonicity can be explained by examining the organisational 
level of local credit markets.  Ongena et al. (2012) explore the determinants of creditors’ 
concentration by using an extensive bank-firm database for German firms. They show 
that bank borrowing is often concentrated in a Hausbank, which plays an important role 
in determining creditor concentration. Similarly, Ogura (2012) predicts that bank market 
power, measured as the price-cost margin, improves credit availability, in particular for 
younger firms, although in the second step of his analysis, the results reveal that the 
adjusted price-cost margin is negatively correlated to the share of nationwide larger 
banks; he also provides evidence for the positive impact of the price-cost margin, as a 
measure of bank market power, on credit availability for new firms, as well as indirect 
evidence that higher bank market power is likely to be generated by relationship banking. 
Ogura (2012) also shows that the price-cost margin is inversely U-shaped, consistent with 
the argument presented by the theoretical model of Dinc (2000). 
 Black and Strahan (2002) examine the effects of bank market concentration on 
the constitution of new firms, and find a strong negative relationship between bank market 
concentration and new business formation. Bonaccorsi di Patti and Dell'Ariccia (2004) 
find the existence of a bell-shaped relationship between bank market concentration and 
company creation. Moreover, these authors also find evidence that bank competition 
might prove less favourable to the creation of new firms in the industrial sector, where 
informational asymmetries are more important. Zarutskie (2006) examines the impact of 
bank competition on bank credit and firm investment, concluding that in competitive bank 
environments younger firms invest less, suggesting that competition increases firm 
financing constraints, diminishing the effects in the long run. This result is in line with 
Rice and Strahan (2010), who find that firms in a more competitive environment are more 
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likely to borrow from banks at a lower cost. Other papers also relate bank market 
concentration and business size. Cetorelli (2004) finds that improving market competition 
leads to the removal of financial barriers to new firms, as well as possibly helping to 
increase company size in terms of added value or employment. Closely related with the 
present study, Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi (2007) find that firms borrowing from banks 
involved in a process of M&A have a higher investment rate after the merger, whilst 
Degryse et al. (2011) criticise Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi(2007) for failing to find a 
larger mergers effect for firms less dependent on banks.  
 Based on the theoretical foundations presented above, we propose the following 
two hypotheses. The first one will benchmark our paper with previous studies while the 
second represents the main contribution: 
Hypothesis 1: There is an inverse relationship between bank market power and firm 
financing and investment. As bank market power increases, firm financing and the 
firm investment rate declines. 
Hypothesis 2: The impact of bank market power is greater in the short run than in the 
long run, as the effects of bank market power will gradually ease. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1. Data 
The main data source for the firm-level data is the Bureau van Dijk’s SABI (2010) 
database. SABI contains comprehensive information on balance sheets, financial 
statements and financial ratios for around 1 million Spanish and Portuguese firms for the 
period 1998 to 2009. Our sample consists of 61,174 Spanish firms, representing a data 
panel consisting of 578,188 company-bank observations. 
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 For each company SABI reports the main bank of each firm. This allows us to 
complement company information with the features of its corresponding bank balance 
sheet and financial statement each period; this way, we are able to link company and bank 
information in a single database. Note that the SABI database is updated regularly and 
information on bank-firm relationships is overwritten. We solve this issue by comparing 
information from previous versions of the database.  
 The second set of variables are those related to bank information. We construct 
the bank dataset from the financial statements provided by the Spanish Banking 
Association (AEB), the Spanish Savings Banks Association (CECA), and the National 
Union of Credit Cooperatives (UNACC).4 After constructing company and bank panel 
data, we merge both datasets by adding the bank information to each firm data point. 
Table 1 contains the definition of and explanatory comments on the variables employed 
in this paper. We winsorize the variables at 1%.  
 
3.2. Empirical approach 
The empirical strategy relies on three important features. Firstly, while most of the 
previous approaches analyse the effects of bank market structure –market power and 
concentration indicators- using static estimators, we employ dynamic specifications to 
estimate the steady-state relationship.5 We take the short-term relationship as a 
benchmark with previous studies. Secondly, we use the Lerner index as measure of bank 
                                                 
4The acronyms correspond to the Spanish denominations: Asociación Española de Banca (AEB), 
Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorros (CECA), and Unión Nacional de Cooperativas 
de Crédito (UNACC). 
5 We thank this suggestion to an anonymous referee and the editor.  
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market power in line with the literature on industrial organization applied to banking. 
Furthermore, we also introduce the HHI based on total assets to test the robustness of our 
results. Finally, we also investigate the role of firm credit availability as the transmission 
channel of bank market power to firm investment. To this purpose, we estimate the impact 
of market power not only on firm investment but also on firm credit availability.  
 As our data consists of both time series and cross-section information, we use 
panel data. As for the time series dimension, we use an Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF 
hereafter) test to examine whether the time series are affected by transitory or permanent 
shocks (Dickey and Fuller, 1979, 1981). Importantly, the financial crisis may incorporate 
a structural break that would affect firm variables, particularly investment. In the presence 
of a structural break the standard ADF tests are biased towards the non-rejection of the 
null hypothesis. Thus, we follow the Perron’s (1989) methodology which includes the 
single exogenous shock (known) break according to the underlying asymptotic theory by 
using a modified ADF test. We test for unit root in investment and bank market structure 
variables in the following three equations: 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜃𝜃0 + 𝜃𝜃1𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜃𝜃5𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃4𝑡𝑡 + ∑ 𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖∆𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖=1                                           (1a) 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜃𝜃0 + 𝜃𝜃1𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜃𝜃2𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃3𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃4𝑡𝑡 + ∑ 𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖∆𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖=1                         (1b) 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜃𝜃0 + 𝜃𝜃1𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜃𝜃2𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃3𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃4𝑡𝑡 + 𝜃𝜃5𝐷𝐷𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + ∑ 𝜗𝜗𝑖𝑖∆𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖=1          (1c) 
where yit represents the variables to be tested, i.e. investment and bank market structure 
variables defined in Table 1; Tt represents the change in the level and takes the value one 
if t = 2007, and zero otherwise; the slope dummy DTt represents the change in the trend 
of the slope function DTt = 1 if t < 2007 and zero otherwise; a crisis dummy  
Crisist = 1 if t = 2007 +1, and zero otherwise. Each of the three models has a unit root 
with a break under the null hypothesis, as the dummy variables are incorporated in the 
system. The alternative hypothesis is a broken trend stationary process.  
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 The cointegration model presented in this research follows the Johansen-Fisher 
panel cointegration test proposed by Maddala and Wu (1999). The Johansen-Fisher test 
is a panel version of the individual Johansen (1988) cointegration test. Based on the same 
fundamentals of the Fisher ADF panel unit root test, the Johansen-Fisher panel 
cointegration test adds the p-values of the Johansen individual eigenvectors and trace 
statistics. Thus, if πi is the p-value from an individual cross-section i = 1…N, under the 
null hypothesis for the panel, the following statistical test is derived:   
𝜆𝜆 = −2∑ log (𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖)~𝜒𝜒2𝑁𝑁2𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=1                                                                                              (2) 
 The next step of this research is to assess the relationship between bank market 
power and firm credit availability (and investment) by running the following 
autoregressive distributed lags (ADL hereafter) model with structural break in order to 
show the impact of bank market power over time besides the steady state:6   
�
𝐼𝐼
𝐾𝐾
�
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
= 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 �𝐼𝐼𝐾𝐾�𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ++∑ 𝜃𝜃𝑘𝑘𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 + ∑ 𝜗𝜗ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖ℎ + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻ℎ=1𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1   
(3) 
where the subscripts i=1…N refers to the firm, j=1…J refers to the bank with which the 
firm operates, k=1…K refers to the industry sector in which the firm operates, and finally, 
h = 1… H refers to a dummy indicating the region where the firm operates. 
 The main endogenous variable to measure firm investment is the ratio of 
investment to company capital (I/K)it,. Firm investment (Iit) will be proxied as the annual 
                                                 
6 Recall that substituting (I/K)it = (I/K)it-1 + Δ(I/K)it , and LERNERijt = LERNERijt-1 + ΔLERNERijt 
yields the error-correction mechanism equivalent to the ADL model proposed in model (3). 
Additionally, in the error correction mechanism is the adjustment of (I/K) to equilibrium 
deviations in the previous period, (I/K)it-1 - βLERNERijt-1.    
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change in the net tangible fixed assets plus the depreciation, while company capital (Kit) 
represents the firm’s fixed assets on its balance sheet. We include two alternative variables 
to measure firm investment and control for robustness in our results.7 Firstly, we include 
asset growth (ΔAit/Ait-1), measured as the change in a firm’s total assets over its lagged 
total assets. This variable predicts future abnormal returns. Secondly, we also include the 
ratio of investment to total assets (I/A)it. As we have explained above, the relationship 
between investment and bank market power may be influenced by a structural break after 
the beginning of the financial crisis in Spain. In this regard, Table 2 demonstrates that the 
level of firm investment has been significantly reduced after the crisis. Consequently, we 
control for the structural break after the banking crisis in Spain by including the variable 
Crisist as defined before.  
 We include an industry dummy variable (INDik) to control for the industry effects 
of company parameters, a regional dummy variable (REGih) to control for geographic 
influence on firm performance. Additionally, we include time dummies (μt).  
 The ADL allows us to test if the relationship between the main variables are 
actually dynamic (i.e. H0: β1 = β3 = 0) and the contemporaneous effect, that we will call 
the short term effect (i.e. H0: β2 = 0). If the former null hypotheses are rejected, the steady-
state or long term effect is estimated as 𝛽𝛽2+𝛽𝛽3
1−𝛽𝛽1
  if   |𝛽𝛽1| < 1.   
 As for the transmission channel of bank market power to firm investment, we also 
test the effects of bank market power on firm credit constraints. Since firms borrow from 
banks in order to invest in fixed capital assets, we repeat the procedure proposed before 
in order to assess whether the effects of bank market power on firm credit availability 
                                                 
7 See Huang et al. (2011). 
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(proxied by firm leverage) is also negative in the short term and positive in the long term. 
Thus, we propose the following ADL estimation:  
�
𝐵𝐵
𝐾𝐾
�
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
= 𝛿𝛿0 + 𝛿𝛿1 �𝐵𝐵𝐾𝐾�𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛿𝛿2𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿3𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛿𝛿4𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 ++∑ 𝜃𝜃𝑘𝑘𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 + ∑ 𝜗𝜗ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖ℎ + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻ℎ=1𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1   
(4) 
where firm leverage (B/K)it is expressed by the ratio of SABI items Non-current 
liabilities: long-term debt and Current liabilities: loans over the firm’s fixed assets., and 
the other variables and subscripts are defined above. Furthermore, we complete our 
analysis by estimating the transmission from firm leverage to firm investment in fixed 
capital which is expected to be positive in the short term and the long term (i.e. δ2 and δ3 
> 0 and | δ1| < 1) to ensure the full transmission of bank market power estimated in model 
(4). Thus, we propose the following ADL specification:  
�
𝐼𝐼
𝐾𝐾
�
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
= 𝛿𝛿0′ + 𝛿𝛿1′ � 𝐼𝐼𝐾𝐾�𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛿𝛿2′ �𝐵𝐵𝐾𝐾�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿3′ �𝐵𝐵𝐾𝐾�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛿𝛿4′𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + +∑ 𝜃𝜃𝑘𝑘𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 +𝐾𝐾𝑘𝑘=1
∑ 𝜗𝜗ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖ℎ + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻ℎ=1                                                                                                (5) 
where the whole variables and the subscripts are defined above.  
 In order to avoid problems of misspecification, we follow the well-established 
approach proposed by Fazzari et al. (1988) and Bond and Meghir (1994) for the 
investment rate. Furthermore, according to previous papers, bank market power may be 
a source of financial constraints. Consequently, we include the effect of bank market 
power with four lags in the complete empirical specification to show that the effect of 
bank market power on firm investment remains regardless the number of lags. Thus, the 
empirical investment equation to be estimated is given by: 
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�
𝐼𝐼
𝐾𝐾
�
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
= 𝜑𝜑0 + 𝜑𝜑1�𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿
𝑙𝑙=1
+ 𝜑𝜑2 � 𝐼𝐼𝐾𝐾�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜑𝜑3 �𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐾𝐾 �𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜑𝜑4 � 𝐼𝐼𝐾𝐾�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖2
+ 𝜑𝜑5 �𝑌𝑌𝐾𝐾�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜑𝜑6 �𝐵𝐵𝐾𝐾�𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−12 + 𝜑𝜑7𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜑𝜑8𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃ℎ𝑖𝑖 + 𝜑𝜑9𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖
+ �𝜃𝜃𝑘𝑘𝐼𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘 + �𝜗𝜗ℎ𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖ℎ + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻
ℎ=1
𝐾𝐾
𝑘𝑘=1
 
(6) 
 The ratio of cash flow over capital (CF/K)it-1 controls for cash flow-investment 
sensitivity (see Bond and Soderbom, 2010; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997, 2000). Cash flow 
(CFit-1) is measured as profit before tax plus depreciation. We measure output (Y/K)it-1  as 
sales generated by the firm over the firm’s fixed assets. We also include the dummy 
variable MAjt to control for bank merger and acquisitions processes. It takes the value 1 
if the bank has been involved in a process of M&A. We also control for the effects of the 
overall economic conditions by including GDPht which is the growth rate of gross 
domestic product. Finally, industry and regional dummy variables are also included in the 
terms defined before.  
 
3.3. Measuring bank market power: Lerner index, and HHI 
 We employ the Lerner index as a measure of market power: 
                                                                                (7) 
where rjt is the interest rate that the bank j charges to borrowers, and rt is the interest rate 
of the inter-bank market, as noted above, and  is the bank’s marginal cost (see 
Appendix A). The margin ( ) determines market power, whereas pjt is the ratio 
of interest income plus other operating income to the bank’s total assets.  
' '
jt t jt jt jt
jt
jt jt
r r C p C
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'
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 As a robustness check we substitute the LERNERjt for the Hirschman-Herfindhal 
index (HHIjt) based on bank assets. The HHI controls for further impacts on the 
distribution of banks assets may have on firm borrowing and investment, beyond the 
impact of Lerner index.  
 
3.4. Granger predictability test 
We use the Granger predictability test to study the direction of the relationship between 
the Lerner index and firm leverage (and) investment, controlling for the other financial 
measures. We employ four lags (l) of the variables in order to capture the long-term 
effects of bank market power (and concentration) measures on firm investment rates. 
Since we are using panel data, the empirical specification follows Holtz-Eakin et al. 
(1988) and consider fixed effects (fi), N firms (i = 1,…, N), and T periods (t = 1,…, T). 
The statistical significance of the Granger predictability test is measured using an F-test. 
In order to state that bank market power predicts firm investment, two conditions should 
be met: 
i) Bank market power must be statistically significant in explaining the firm investment 
rate: 
�
𝐼𝐼
𝐾𝐾
�
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
= 𝜓𝜓0 + ∑ 𝜓𝜓𝑙𝑙 �𝐼𝐼𝐾𝐾�𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−𝑙𝑙 + ∑ 𝜒𝜒𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−𝑙𝑙 + 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖 + 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙=1𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙=1                        (8a) 
ii) Firm investment rate should not be significant in explaining bank market structure: 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝜓𝜓0′ + ∑ 𝜓𝜓𝑙𝑙′ � 𝐼𝐼𝐾𝐾�𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−𝑙𝑙 + ∑ 𝜒𝜒𝑙𝑙′𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−𝑙𝑙 + 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖 + 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙=1𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙=1              (8b) 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Summary statistics and parametric and non-parametric tests 
Table 2 reports the summary statistics of the variables employed in this study. In Panel A 
we observe that the firm investment rate (I/K)t has a mean of 0.23, ranging from 0.00 to 
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0.99, while asset growth (ΔAit/Ait-1) and the investment to assets ratio show a mean value 
of 0.11 and 0.07, respectively. Regarding control variables, the ratio of cash flow over 
capital (CF/K)it displays a mean of 0.89, while the ratio of leverage over capital (B/K)it has 
a mean of 1.57. The Lerner index (LERNERt) is the variable of interest, showing a mean 
value of 0.22 and ranging between 0.001 and 0.68, while the mean value for the HHI is 
1.29 per cent. Panel B reports the mean values of investment variables divided in four 
quartiles of the Lerner index. This first statistical test shows, for the whole sample, that 
(I/K)it ranges from 0.32 in the first quartile to 0.28 in the fourth quartile, whilst (I/A)it 
ranges from 0.09 in the first quartile to 0.08 in the fourth quartile. This observation 
suggests that investment variables decrease as bank market power increases. 
Additionally, we break the sample down into large firms and SMEs. The mean values 
show similar ratios for both groups of companies, as well as similar behaviour and 
significance. On the other hand, as for (ΔAit/Ait-1) we find that the average ratio is higher 
for the group of large firms, although the pattern of the variable evolves similarly for both 
groups of firms. Finally, the F overall test rejects the null that investment ratios are 
independent of the four quartiles of the Lerner index (H0: βn-quartile = 0), which support the 
hypothesis that the amount of firm investment in fixed capital, measured through (I/K)it 
and (I/A)it, decreases insofar as the level of bank market power, measured through the 
Lerner index, increases.  
 To complement the above results we perform a mean-difference test, as shown in 
Table 3. In the first step, we create the dummy variable Lerner_Djt which takes the value 
of one for values of LERNERit from the third quartile in order to proxy for an environment 
of high bank market power. We show that the parametric test rejects the null hypothesis 
(H0: mean(0) – mean(1) = 0) for all our investment variables, and further show that the 
alternative hypothesis is confirmed for (I/K)it and (I/A)it for an environment with a lower 
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level of bank market power at one per cent (H1: mean(0) – mean (1) > 0). Contrary to our 
expectations, the asset growth (ΔAit/Ait-1) variable displays higher values in an 
environment of high bank market power. Regarding (CF/K)it, we show that firms tend to 
maintain higher liquidity levels in higher bank market power environments, which reveals 
a conservative attitude of firms regarding investment. The other variable of interest is 
leverage (B/K)it, and we expect to be easier for firms to obtain bank financing in a more 
competitive banking market, as well as (rB/TA)it which shows that in a more competitive 
banking market it is cheaper to obtain bank financing. These tests suggest that, in the 
presence of bank market power, firms are less able to obtain bank financing since credit 
availability is also restricted. Additionally, we find that the cost of bank financing is also 
higher in environments of higher bank market power. This result is consistent with 
previous papers, which show that an increase in bank market concentration leads to a 
reduction in the availability of loans and a subsequent increase in the interest rates that 
banks charge firms (see Canales and Nanda, 2012; Erel, 2011; Kano et al., 2011; Rice 
and Strahan, 2010 and Panetta et al., 2009; Beck et al., 2004, 2006b; Carbó et al., 2009).  
 As a first test of the impact of the crisis, we split the sample in two parts: before 
and after 2007. We show that the parametric tests reject the null hypothesis (H0: Pre-crisis 
(0) – Crisis (1) = 0) for all investment variables, and the alternative hypothesis is 
confirmed for an environment of financial crisis (H1: Pre-crisis (0) – Crisis (1) > 0).  
Finally, Table 4 show the main estimation of the translog cost function described 
in Appendix B.  
 
4.2. Short term and long term analysis of bank market power 
Before analysing the effects of bank market power on firm investment from a dynamic 
perspective, we should test for the existence of unit roots in the single variables, and 
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cointegration between the target variables taking into consideration the structural change. 
Panel A of Table 5 shows the results of the ADF test before the financial crisis (1a), after 
the crisis (1b), and for the whole period (1c). The results reject the null hypothesis of unit 
roots at the 1 per cent and the 5 per cent level. Panel B of Table 5 shows the results of the 
Johansen-Fisher panel cointegration test. The trace tests indicate that two cointegration 
relationships exist before and after the financial crisis.  
 The estimation of the expression (3) is shown in Panel A of Table 6 by using the 
Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator in order to test our hypotheses. Two and three-
period-lagged values of the explanatory variables are used as instruments.8 The results 
suggest that a 1 per cent increase in bank market power, measured as LERNERjt, reduces 
the firm investment rate (I/K)it by 0.55 per cent on average in the short term. This result 
remains robust when taking into consideration other measures of investment. Similarly, 
increasing bank market power by 1 per cent implies an estimated short-term reduction of 
0.14 per cent and 0.01 per cent of firm total assets (ΔAit/Ait-1) and investment over fixed 
assets (I/K)it, respectively (H0: β2 = 0). Furthermore, the β3 estimate for expression (3) –
positive, significant, and higher than β2 in absolute value- indicates that firm investment 
becomes positive in subsequent periods -increasing investment by 0.55 per cent (p-value 
< 0.000) after the first period, and 0.05 per cent (p-value < 0.000) after the second period. 
A one-standard-deviation increase in bank market power augments firm investment by 
0.05 per cent (p-value < 0.000) in the long term for the median observation. The results 
for (ΔAit/Ait-1) are qualitatively similar confirming that after the first period investment 
                                                 
8 This treatment eliminates the most common source of endogeneity, although it would be not 
completely eliminated if errors are correlated over time. We include Sargan test as well as the 
AR(2) and the AR(3) tests to confirm the validity of the instruments used in our estimations.   
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growth is increased by 0.33 per cent (p-value < 0.000) and 0.02 per cent (p-value < 0.000) 
after the second period. A one-standard-deviation increase in bank market power 
augments the dependent variable by 0.20 per cent (p-value < 0.000) in the long term for 
the median observation. We find similar results for (I/A)it growing towards the steady 
state of 0.0001 (p-value < 0.000). However, we find a negative sign for large firms since, 
as we previously found, the effect is significant for total assets (denominator) but not for 
fixed capital (numerator).  
Taken together, these results confirm that firm investment is affected negatively 
by bank market power in the short term as predicted by the first hypotheses. 
Notwithstanding, firm investment is gradually increasing after the shock provoked by the 
bank market power reaching positive levels in the long term. This last result confirms our 
second hypothesis. The standard Sargan and AR(2) and AR(3) tests reject the null and 
demonstrates the orthogonality of the employed instruments.  
 We are also interested in studying whether the effect of bank market power has a 
similar effect on large firms, and SMEs. We obtain the expected signs for all firms but 
the short-term impact of bank market power is higher for SMEs (-0.5539) than for large 
companies (-0.4794). Likewise, we obtain similar results when the variables (ΔAit/Ait-1) 
and (I/K)it are taken into consideration. Similarly, the analysis of the steady state also 
shows that SMEs are more sensible to changes in bank market power in the long term 
than large firms.  
 
4.3. The transmission channel 
It may be argued that the relationship between firm investment and bank market power is 
driven by firm borrowing to invest in fixed assets. The estimations of the equations (4) 
and (5) are shown in Table 7. Using the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator, we test the effect 
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of bank market power on firm leverage (B/K)it. Two and three period-lagged values of 
the explanatory variables are used as instruments. The estimation of the parameter δ2 
indicates that increasing bank market power by 1 per cent reduces firm leverage by 0.48 
per cent in the short term in consonance with the result obtained in the previous section. 
As for the long-term, the results reject the joint null hypothesis for bank market power 
measures –both LERNERjt and HHIjt- (H0: δ2= δ3=0) and the null for the adjustment 
parameter in both cases (H0: δ1=0 and δ1=1). Additionally, we also find that the estimation 
of the parameter δ3 is positive, significant and higher than δ2 indicating that, in the long 
term, a one-standard-deviation increase in bank market power augments firm leverage by 
0.08 per cent (p-value < 0.002), which means that firms are able to borrow more despite 
the impact of bank market power. As explained in the previous sub-section, we are also 
concerned to study the differences in the effects for SMEs and large firms. We find that 
SMEs reduce firm leverage by 45 per cent (p-value < 0.000) in the short term, while the 
result is not significant for large firms.  
 The second question to be addressed in this sub-section is whether the effects 
described before are fully transmitted to firm investment. To proceed we estimate the 
equation (5) also using the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator. We find that the effects in 
the short term and the long term are positive and significant rejecting the null jointly for 
both leverage parameters (𝐻𝐻0: 𝛿𝛿2′ = 𝛿𝛿3′ = 0) and the adjustment parameter (𝐻𝐻0: 𝛿𝛿1′ = 0  
and 𝛿𝛿1′ = 1), as expected. These estimations suggest that leverage acts as a transmission 
channel for the effects of bank market power. The standard Sargan and AR(2) and AR(3) 
tests reject the null and demonstrates the orthogonality of the instruments. 
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4.4. Results of the augmented model 
The estimations of equation (6) are shown in Table 8. Two and three-period-lagged values 
of the explanatory variables are used as instruments. The results are consistent with those 
presented in previous sections. The number of lags in this analysis is four. No significant 
results are found for lags larger than four periods. In line with our hypotheses, we find 
that an increase in bank market power leads to a reduction of firms’ investment rate (I/K)it 
for the first two lags, i.e. -0.0311 and -0.0659 for LERNERjt-1 and LERNERjt-2, respectively. 
We find a positive and significant relationship for the subsequent periods-i.e. 0.2396 and 
0.1108 for LERNERjt-4 and LERNERjt-4, respectively. These results are robust if we 
substitute (I/K)it for asset growth (ΔAit/Ait-1) and if we use investment over assets ratio 
(I/A)it as the dependent variable. 
 We are also interested in studying whether the effect of bank market power has a 
similar effect on large, medium and small firms. We obtain the expected signs for all three 
types of firms but also find that the effect of bank market power is higher and significant 
at 1 per cent for SMEs (0.3533) than for large companies (0.3272). Moreover, we find 
that the correction for firm investment is also higher for SMEs (0.2899) than for large 
firms (0.2108). These results are robust to the consideration of merger activities, MAjt , 
since we obtain negative and significant coefficients for the whole sample (-0.0284), 
being significant for SMEs (-0.0298) suggesting that bank merger processes have a 
stronger influence on smaller firms than larger ones.  
   
4. 5. Granger predictability test: results 
We are also interested in studying the predictability between firm investment and bank 
market power. We employ the Granger predictability test with four lags for bank market 
power and concentration variables, and the firm investment rate. The vector for 
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instrumental variables includes the first difference of the ratios sales over fixed capital 
(Sales/K)it-1 and the variable (EBITDA/K)it-1 to proxy for creditworthiness, and the 
variable (CF/K)it-1 in first differences is considered as a endogenous regressor because 
firm’s generation of cash flow might be influenced by other factors such as the volume 
of sales. The standard Hansen-J test rejects the null and demonstrates the orthogonality 
of the employed instruments, and the endogeneity test rejects the null that (CF/K)it-1 could 
be treated as an exogenous regressor.9 Finally, valid inference is ensured since the 
standard errors and test statistics are robust to heterokedasticity and clustering on regional 
level. 
The results shown in Table 9 suggest that bank market power (LERNERjt) predicts 
firm investment, but firm investment does not predict bank market power. To check the 
robustness of this result, we incorporate the HHI as an alternative measure of bank market 
power. The results are qualitatively similar to those obtained above in signs and 
significance. The results are in line with the GMM estimations of the previous section.  
  
4. 6. Robustness check: the effects of bank concentration 
The specifications of the models presented in Table 6 and Table 8 suggest that bank 
market power exerts a negative effect on the company interest rate in the short-term, 
although this relationship turns positive in the long-term.  
                                                 
9 Endogeneity test is computed, like the C statistic, as the difference of two Sargan-Hansen 
statistics in which the first model is treated as an equation with a smaller set of instruments in 
which the suspect regressor/s is treated as endogenous, and the second model is treated as a 
large set in which the suspect regressor/s is treated as exogenous. 
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 To check the robustness of our previous results, we estimate in Panel B of Table 
6 and Table 10 four alternative specifications replacing LERNERjt by HHIjt, and breaking 
down the sample into large firms and SMEs. The correspondence of the HHI and Lerner 
indices, and their relationship with firms’ investment, depends on the evolution of market 
contestability and bank information production (see Carbó et al., 2009; Ongena et al., 
2012; Panetta et al., 2009; Presbitero and Zazzaro, 2011). Our results ar similar to those 
obtained using the Lerner index.  
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper investigates the relationship between bank market power and firm investment 
over time. The main finding is that bank market power exerts a negative effect on firm 
investment in the short-term (e.g. Carbó et al., 2009; Ryan et al., 2014). However, we find 
that this relationship turns positive in the long-run.   
 To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper that analyses the repercussions 
of bank market power on long-term firm investment. The transmission channel is also 
tested. We find that firm borrowing is affected by bank market power in the same way 
that investment in fixed capital.  
 We also perform a Granger predictability test in order to determine the 
predictability relationship between bank market power and the firm investment rate. Our 
results confirm that bank market power is a determinant of firm investment, but no 
predictability is found in the opposite direction. The results are robust to different 
measures of concentration and market power.  
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Table 1: 
Definition of variables 
Variable Definition 
Company  
Firm investment 
(I/K)it 
This ratio is the endogenous variable and represents the rate of investment. It is 
defined as the annual change in the net tangible fixed assets plus the depreciation (I) 
over the amount of tangible fixed assets at year end. 
Asset growth 
(ΔAit/Ait-1) 
This ratio constitutes an alternative proxy for investment growth in terms of total 
assets. This ratio is defined as the growth rate of firm’s total assets.  
Investment over 
assets (I/A)it 
This ratio is defined as the difference between firm investment, as defined above (I), 
and a firm’s total assets (A). This ratio is also a proxy for the investment level of 
firms. 
Cash flow over 
capital  
(CF/K) it 
This ratio is defined as cash flow relative to the proportion of capital. Cash flow is 
defined as net income plus depreciation plus changes in deferred taxes (Kaplan and 
Zingales, 1997, 2000; Fazzari et al., 2000). 
Firm leverage 
(B/K) it 
This ratio measures company leverage over the proportion of capital. This variable 
represents the level of risk which the firm is able to run. 
Bank interest rate 
for I (rB/TA) it 
This ratio measures the financial cost over a firm’s total assets. The term rB represents 
the interest rate paid by the firm to obtain bank financing. 
Company output 
(Y/K) it 
This variable represents company output. This ratio is proxied as total sales plus the 
variation in stocks during the year over the amount of tangible fixed assets. 
Bank variables 
LERNERjt The Lerner index measures the degree of competition in banking markets. This index 
is defined as the difference between the price and the bank’s marginal cost, divided 
by the price, and measures the capacity of the bank to set a price above the marginal 
cost, being an inverse function of the elasticity of demand and the number of banks. 
LERNER_Dji This dummy variable takes the value of one if Lerner is above the median, and zero 
otherwise. 
HHIjt The Herfindhal-Hirschman concentration index measures the degree of market 
concentration. This index is defined as the squared market shares of each of the banks 
operating in the Spanish market. 
Ln(TAjt) This measure represents bank size. The variable is measured by a natural logarithm. 
Price of labour 
(w1)jt 
This ratio is defined as personnel costs over total assets. The variable is measured by 
a natural logarithm (Ryan et al., 2014).  
Price of capital 
(w2)jt 
This ratio is defined as operating costs (except personnel costs) over fixed assets. The 
variable is measured by a natural logarithm. 
Price of 
deposits(w3)jt 
This ratio is defined as financial costs over deposits. The variable is measured by a 
natural logarithm. 
  
Mergers and 
acquisitions 
(MAjt) 
This dummy controls for mergers and acquisitions processes, and takes the value of 
one if the financial institution has been involved in a process of M&A. 
Regional GDP 
growth (GDPht) 
Real GDP growth (%) at regional level.  
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Table 2: 
Summary statistics 
 
Panel A: Summary statistics  
Variable Observations Mean Median SD Min. Max. 
Company variables  
(I/K)it 427,912 0.2312 0.1539 0.2299 0.0000 0.9999 
(I/K)2it 427,912 0.1062 0.0236 0.1833 0.0000 0.9999 
(ΔAit/Ait-1) 435,816 0.2309 0.1698 0.2563 -0.1169 0.9244 
(ΔAit/Ait-1)2  435,816 0.1220 0.0334 0.2142 0.0004 0.8546 
(I/A)it 427,901 0.0774 0.0380 0.1082 0.0000 0.9988 
(I/A)2it 427,901 0.0177 0.0014 0.0572 0.0000 0.9976 
(CF/K)it 483,066 0.8941 0.3741 1.3287 -0.0972 5.2827 
(B/K)it 362,192 1.5671 0.6961 2.2459 6.30e-06 8.7223 
(B/K)2it 362,192 7.4995 0.4845 19.0803 3.97e-11 76.0772 
(rB/TA)it 451,584 0.0182 0.0139 0.0164 1.49e-06 0.0843 
(Y/K)it 391,289 18.1589 8.4391 21.0276 1.5789 67.1924 
Bank variables  
LERNERjt 286,305 0.2194 0.1983 0.1494 0.0007 0.6833 
HHIjt 578,093 0.0129 0.0025 0.0198 0.0001 0.0786 
Ln(TAjt) 577,021 18.0254 18.1683 1.6188 10.6366 20.8281 
Price of labour 
(ln(w1jt)) 575,320 -4.5695 -4.5281 0.3245 -6.7916 -1.3615 
Price of capital 
(ln(w2jt)) 568,459 -2.4709 -2.4125 1.5716 -10.4102 5.8064 
Price of deposits 
(ln(w3jt)) 577,021 -3.7199 -3.7291 0.4123 -8.6997 -0.8854 
MAjt 578,188 0.3408 0.0000 0.4739 0.0000 1.0000 
GDPht 578,188 0.0289 0.0342 0.0241 -0.0452 0.0713 
Panel B: Means of investment variables, cash flow and leverage depending on the 
quartiles of LERNERjt. Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 Observations 1
st 
Quartile 
2nd 
Quartile 
3rd 
Quartile 
4th 
Quartile 
F-test 
[p-value] 
(I/K)it Complete 
sample 
427,912 0.3151*** 
(0.0007) 
0.2853*** 
(0.0007) 
0.2975*** 
(0.0007) 
0.2835*** 
(0.0007) 
268.09 
[0.0000] 
Large 
firms 
49,887 0.3216*** 
(0.0019) 
0.3046*** 
(0.0021) 
0.3133*** 
(0.0021) 
0.3089*** 
(0.0022) 
10.83 
[0.0000] 
SME 378,025 0.3137*** (0.0008) 
0.2828*** 
(0.0008) 
0.2952*** 
(0.0008) 
0.2799*** 
(0.0008) 
254.49 
[0.0000] 
(ΔAit/Ait-
1) 
Complete 
sample 
435,816 0.2173*** 
(0.0008) 
0.2128*** 
(0.0008) 
0.2337*** 
(0.0008) 
0.2579*** 
(0.0008) 
667.80 
[0.0000] 
Large 
firms 
52,047 0.2551*** 
(0.0023) 
0.2439*** 
(0.0025) 
0.2530*** 
(0.0025) 
0.2709*** 
(0.0024) 
21.09 
[0.0000] 
SME 383,769 0.2112*** (0.0009) 
0.2089*** 
(0.0008) 
0.2314*** 
(0.0008) 
0.2562*** 
(0.0008) 
690.04 
[0.0000] 
(I/A)it Complete 
sample 
427,901 0.0874*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0721*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0736*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0788*** 
(0.0003) 
404.89 
[0.0000] 
Large 
firms 
49,885 0.0943*** 
(0.0009) 
0.0783*** 
(0.0009) 
0.0807*** 
(0.0009) 
0.0939*** 
(0.0009) 
70.12 
[0.0000] 
SME 378,016 0.0860*** (0.0003) 
0.0713*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0725*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0766*** 
(0.0003) 
326.75 
[0.0000] 
Notes: *, **, *** statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1% level 
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Table 3: 
Parametric test for comparison of means for equality of distribution functions by 
LERNER_Djt. and the financial crisis (2007-2009).  
 
  Mean differences are reported. 
Diff = Low Lerner (0) – High (1)  
under H0: Diff = 0. 
 Mean differences are reported. 
Diff = Pre-crisis (0) – Crisis (1) under 
H0: Diff = 0. 
Variable  
Coefficient 
(t-
statistics) 
Standard 
errors  
Coefficient 
(t-statistics) 
Standard 
errors 
       
(I/K)it Complete 
sample 
 0.0080*** 
(10.6653) 0.0008 
 0.0445*** 
(54.4846) 
0.0008 
Large firms  0.0026* 
(1.3092) 0.0021 
 0.0233*** 
(18.5596) 
0.0013 
SME  0.0085*** 
(10.5588) 0.0008 
 0.0087*** 
(25.3075) 
0.0003 
(ΔAit/Ait-1) Complete 
sample 
 -0.0306*** 
(-39.1897) 0.0008 
 0.0364*** 
(46.0235) 
0.0008 
Large firms  -0.0120*** 
(-5.0591) 0.0024 
 0.0465*** 
(17.0032) 
0.0028 
SME  -0.0335*** 
(-40.5033) 0.0008 
 0.0349*** 
(41.9932) 
0.0008 
(I/A)it Complete 
sample 
 0.0029*** 
(9.8421) 0.0003 
 0.0099*** 
(29.5336) 
0.0003 
Large firms  0.0001 
(0.2149) 0.0009 
 0.0237*** 
(18.5965) 
0.0013 
SME  0.0032*** 
(10.1658) 0.0003 
 0.0078*** 
(22.1385) 
0.0004 
(CF/K)it Complete sample 
 -0.0312*** 
(-8.0834) 0.0039 
 0.1022*** 
(24.4209) 
0.0042 
 Large firms  0.0049
*** 
(0.4717) 0.0104 
 -0.0570*** 
(-3.8600) 
0.0148 
 SME  -0.0362
*** 
(-8.7393) 0.0042 
 0.1209*** 
(27.3894) 
0.0044 
(B/K)it Complete sample 
 0.0851*** 
(12.5158) 0.0068 
 -0.4555*** 
(-53.2683) 
0.0086 
 Large firms  0.0033
*** 
(0.1884) 0.0178 
 -0.6861*** 
(-22.6777) 
0.0303 
 SME  0.0998
*** 
(13.5713) 0.0074 
 -0.4348*** 
(-48.3391) 
0.0089 
(rB/TA)it Complete sample 
 0.0015*** 
(30.3264) 0.0001 
 -0.0013*** 
(-25.6102) 
0.0001 
 Large firms  0.0005
*** 
(4.0171) 0.0001 
 -0.0001 
(-0.0587) 
0.0002 
 SME  0.0015
*** 
(31.1480) 0.0001 
 -0.0014*** 
(-26.8265) 
0.0001 
(Y/K)it Complete sample 
 -0.6092*** 
(-8.98) 0.0678 
 2.0660*** 
(28.32) 
0.0729 
 Large firms  -0.5374
*** 
(-2.73) 0.1962 
 1.8669*** 
(7.01) 
0.2661 
 SME  -0.6112
*** 
(-8.46) 0.0723 
 2.1718*** 
(28.41) 
0.0764 
Notes: T-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are reported.  
           *, **, *** statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 4: 
Cost function coefficient estimates.  
SUR estimation.  
Cost shares are the predicted share of costs spent on each input. 
 Coefficient Standard Error 
Intercept -0.8707*** 0.3198 
Ln(TAjt) 1.1969*** 0.0278 
Ln(TAjt)2 0.0010 0.0014 
ln(w1jt) 1.2785*** 0.0458 
ln(w2jt) 0.0474*** 0.0159 
ln(w3jt) 0.4790*** 0.0485 
ln(w1jt)2 0.1477*** 0.0032 
ln(w2jt)2 0.0006 0.0004 
ln(w3jt)2 0.0111*** 0.0011 
ln(w1jt) × ln(w2jt) 0.0071*** 0.0058 
ln(w1jt) × ln(w3jt) 0.1673*** 
 
0.0031 
ln(w2jt) × ln(w3jt) 0.0112*** 0.0011 
ln(w1jt) × Ln(TAjt) 0.0183*** 0.0062 
ln(w2jt) × Ln(TAjt) 0.0060*** 0.0019 
ln(w3jt) × Ln(TAjt) 0.0935*** 0.0063 
Trend 0.0003*** 0.0002 
Trend2 0.0000*** 0.0000 
Trend × Ln(TAjt) 0.0000* 0.0000 
Trend × ln(w1jt) -0.0001* 0.0000 
Trend × ln(w2jt) 0.0002*** 0.0000 
Trend × ln(w3jt) 0.0000 0.0000 
Number of banks 111  
R2 0.9855  
F-overall test 0.0000  
Notes: *, **, *** statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 5: Unit root test and cointegration analysis with structural break 
 
Panel A: Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests with four lags.  
 Model A 
(1998-2006) 
 Model B 
(2007-2009) 
 Model C 
(1998-2009) 
 Coefficient 
(θ1) 
t-
stats 
 Coefficient 
(θ1) 
t-stats  Coefficient 
(θ1) 
t-stats 
(I/K)it -0.6461*** 
(0.0565) 
-11.42  -0.7794*** 
(0.0551) 
-14.12  -0.6427*** 
(0.0556) 
-11.55 
(ΔAit/Ait-1) -0.0571*** 
(0.0152) 
-3.75  -0.0453** 
(0.0190) 
-2.37  -0.0558*** 
(0.0152) 
-3.67 
(I/A)it  -0.2502*** 
(0.0252) 
-9.95  -0.8157*** 
(0.0892) 
-9.15  -0.2515*** 
(0.0248) 
-10.11 
(B/K)it -0.2583*** 
(0.0203) 
-12.74  -0.2781*** 
(0.0207) 
-13.42  -0.2570*** 
(0.0202) 
-12.75 
LERNERjt -0.1042*** 
(0.0055) 
-18.85  -0.0109*** 
(0.0037) 
-2.90  -0.0185*** 
(0.0041) 
-4.51 
HHIjt -0.0041** 
(0.0020) 
-1.99  -0.0156*** 
(0.0028) 
-5.57  -0.0082*** 
(0.0021) 
-3.99 
Notes: *, **, *** Rejection of the null hypothesis of unit roots at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.  
           Robust standard error in parentheses. 
 
 
Panel B: Johansen-Fisher’s panel cointegration test. Endogenous variables include 
investment, leverage, and bank market power measures. Trace (statistical t) is reported.  
  1998 - 2006  2007 - 2009 
 H0: range = r LERNERjt HHIjt  LERNERjt HHIjt 
(I/K)it r = 0 100.7801*** 98.2332***  40.4592*** 40.2532*** 
 r ≤ 1 53.0434*** 49.9557***  24.9599*** 25.6017*** 
 r ≤ 2 24.6713*** 20.0231***  11.5603*** 12.8025*** 
(ΔAit/Ait-1) r = 0 95.5716*** 92.5612***  40.0731*** 40.4480*** 
 r ≤ 1 53.6084*** 50.3792***  24.3659*** 25.6961*** 
 r ≤ 2 24.5128*** 20.7696***  11.3835*** 12.9843*** 
(I/A)it r = 0 92.0451*** 89.4943***  39.3427*** 40.8908*** 
 r ≤ 1 53.6996*** 49.0433***  24.6134*** 25.0168*** 
 r ≤ 2 24.4557*** 20.6823***  11.4716*** 12.1602*** 
Notes: *, **, *** Cointegration exists at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.    
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Table 6: ADL model 
Panel A: The effects of Lerner index on firm investment 
Arellano and Bond (1991) dynamic panel data regression. 
White (1980) heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
  (I/K)it  (ΔAit/Ait-1)  (I/A)it 
  Complete 
sample SME 
Large 
firms  
Complete 
sample SME Large firms  
Complete 
sample SME Large firms 
             
Intercept  0.2560*** 
(0.0028) 
0.2554*** 
(0.0031) 
0.2611*** 
(0.0063) 
 0.2328*** 
(0.0051) 
0.2297*** 
(0.0050) 
0.2531*** 
(0.0050) 
 0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
Dependentit-
1 
 0.0670*** 
(0.0046) 
0.0661*** 
(0.0048) 
0.1038*** 
(0.0172) 
 0.0442*** 
(0.0048) 
0.0455*** 
(0.0051) 
0.0289** 
(0.0134) 
 0.0380*** 
(0.0060) 
0.0360*** 
(0.0066) 
0.0844*** 
(0.0223) 
LERNERjt  -0.5467*** 
(0.0176) 
-0.5539*** 
(0.0186) 
-0.4794*** 
(0.0628) 
 -0.1413*** 
(0.0112) 
-0.1454*** 
(0.0120) 
-0.0813*** 
(0.0220) 
 -0.0002*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0002*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0002*** 
(0.0000) 
LERNERjt-1  0.5898*** 
(0.0128) 
0.5986*** 
(0.0132) 
0.4903*** 
(0.0774) 
 0.3363*** 
(0.0177) 
0.3329*** 
(0.0171) 
0.3493*** 
(0.0437) 
 0.0003*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0003*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
Crisist  -0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
 -0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
 -0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001* 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
Industry 
dummies 
 YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Regional 
dummies 
 YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Time 
dummies 
 YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
             
Steady state  0.0463** 
(0.0252) 
0.0478** 
(0.0264) 
0.0121 
(0.1005) 
 0.2040*** 
(0.0189) 
0.1963*** 
(0.0183) 
0.2759*** 
(0.0532) 
 0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0004* 
(0.0000) 
Obs  363,934 325,733 38,201  372,207 332,384 39,823  363,924 325,725 38,199 
Sargan test 
(p-value) 
 0.055 0.054 0.221  0.510 0.380 0.486  0.057 0.058 0.114 
m2  
(p-value) 
 0.750 0.719 0.702  0.074 0.078 0.192  0.663 0.788 0.555 
m3  
(p-value) 
 0.514 0.644 0.174  0.010 0.009 0.226  0.836 0.702 0.470 
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Panel B: The effects of HHI on firm investment 
Arellano and Bond (1991) dynamic panel data regression. 
White (1980) heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
  (I/K)it  (ΔAit/Ait-1)  (I/A)it 
  Complete 
sample SME 
Large 
firms  
Complete 
sample SME Large firms  
Complete 
sample SME Large firms 
             
Intercept  0.2302*** 
(0.0026) 
0.2310*** 
(0.0027) 
0.2269*** 
(0.0088) 
 0.2847*** 
(0.0046) 
0.2842*** 
(0.0047) 
0.2914*** 
(0.0080) 
 0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
Dependentit-
1 
 0.0562*** 
(0.0082) 
0.0563*** 
(0.0084) 
0.0484 
(0.0313) 
 0.2024*** 
(0.0116) 
0.1997*** 
(0.0116) 
0.2272*** 
(0.0355) 
 0.0341*** 
(0.0065) 
0.0317*** 
(0.0070) 
0.0723** 
(0.0227) 
HHIjt  -0.0624*** 
(0.0098) 
-0.0656*** 
(0.0101) 
-0.0213 
(0.0352) 
 -0.0682*** 
(0.0057) 
-0.0677*** 
(0.0064) 
-0.0601*** 
(0.0101) 
 -0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 
HHIjt-1  0.0657*** 
(0.0104) 
0.0689*** 
(0.0107) 
0.0249 
(0.0359) 
 0.0691*** 
(0.0061) 
0.0689*** 
(0.0068) 
0.0621*** 
(0.0100) 
 0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0000** 
(0.0000) 
Crisist  -0.2302*** 
(0.0026) 
-0.2310*** 
(0.0027) 
-0.2269*** 
(0.0088) 
 -0.0812*** 
(0.0035) 
-0.0834*** 
(0.0036) 
-0.0502*** 
(0.0027) 
 -0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
Industry 
dummies 
 YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Regional 
dummies 
 YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Time 
dummies 
 YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
             
Steady state  0.0035*** 
(0.0008) 
0.0035*** 
(0.0008) 
0.0038* 
(0.0019) 
 0.0012* 
(0.0006) 
0.0014** 
(0.0006) 
0.0026** 
(0.0011) 
 0.0001* 
(0.0000) 
0.0001* 
(0.0000) 
0.0001* 
(0.0000) 
Obs  274,913 250,371 24,542  283,329 257,706 25,623  332,603 300,529 32,074 
Sargan test 
(p-value) 
 0.341 0.396 0.596  0.335 0.293 0.106  0.279 0.583 0.374 
m2  
(p-value) 
 0.636 0.684 0.249  0.003 0.003 0.006  0.608 0.115 0.567 
m3  
(p-value) 
 0.109 0.118 0.177  0.115 0.105 0.878  0.366 0.488 0.428 
Notes: *, **, *** statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 7: Transmission channel of bank market power, leverage, and firm investment  
Arellano and Bond (1991) dynamic panel data regression.  White (1980) heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
  (B/K)it  (I/K)it 
  Lerner  HHI   
  Complete 
sample SME 
Large 
firms  
Complete 
sample SME Large firms  
Complete 
sample SME Large firms 
Intercept  0.1412*** 
(0.0303) 
0.1575*** 
(0.0225) 
0.0034 
(0.0982) 
 0.0661*** 
(0.0071) 
0.0735*** 
(0.0075) 
0.0563** 
(0.0235) 
 0.0936*** 
(0.0105) 
0.0907*** 
(0.0107) 
0.0897** 
(0.0334) 
Dependentit-1  0.4773*** 
(0.0485) 
0.4461*** 
(0.0380) 
0.7585*** 
(0.1714) 
 0.6957*** 
(0.0048) 
0.6827*** 
(0.0050) 
0.7097*** 
(0.0150) 
 0.0715*** 
(0.0090) 
0.0716*** 
(0.0092) 
0.0834*** 
(0.0119) 
MARKET 
POWERjt 
 -0.4240*** 
(0.0671) 
-0.4512*** 
(0.0711) 
-0.0714 
(0.1236) 
 -0.0161*** 
(0.0044) 
-0.0135** 
(0.0046) 
-0.0227 
(0.0131) 
    
MARKET 
POWERjt-1 
 0.6229*** 
(0.0802) 
0.6512*** 
(0.0802) 
0.3173* 
(0.1751) 
 0.0247*** 
(0.0040) 
0.0234*** 
(0.0042) 
0.0160 
(0.0129) 
    
(B/K)it          0.0836*** 
(0.0176) 
0.1025*** 
(0.0189) 
0.5652*** 
(0.0906) 
(B/K)it-1          0.0643*** 
(0.0145) 
0.0589*** 
(0.0150) 
0.2176*** 
(0.0438) 
Crisist  -0.0413** 
(0.0185) 
-0.0422** 
(0.0203) 
-0.0482** 
(0.0223) 
 -0.2249*** 
(0.0110) 
-0.2290*** 
(0.0118) 
-0.1356*** 
(0.0323) 
 -0.1394*** 
(0.0124) 
-0.1458*** 
(0.0131) 
-0.1088*** 
(0.0144) 
Industry 
dummies 
 YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Regional 
dummies 
 YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Time 
dummies 
 YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Steady state  0.3806*** 
(0.1254) 
0.3610*** 
(0.1101) 
1.0180 
(1.4930) 
 0.0284* 
(0.0155) 
0.0311** 
(0.0158) 
-0.0233 
(0.0518) 
 0.1592*** 
(0.0147) 
0.1738*** 
(0.0149) 
0.8540*** 
(0.1411) 
Obs  155,608 136,932 18,676  111,498 97,816 13,682  231,470 222,228 166,539 
Sargan test 
(p-value) 
 0.502 0.618 0.502  0.249 0.481 0.624  0.519 0.606 0.197 
m2  
(p-value) 
 0.346 0.010 0.346  0.014 0.025 0.360  0.000 0.523 0.362 
m3  
(p-value) 
 0.268 0.835 0.268  0.228 0.327 0.263  0.675 0.580 0.918 
Notes: *, **, *** statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 8: The impact of bank market power on firm investment, 1998-2009 
Arellano and Bond (1991) dynamic panel data regression. 
White (1980) heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. 
  (I/K)it  (ΔAit/Ait-1)  (I/A)it 
  Complete 
sample SME 
Large 
firms  
Complete 
sample SME Large firms  
Complete 
sample SME Large firms 
             
Intercept  0.2857*** 
(0.0085) 
0.2899*** 
(0.0088) 
0.2108*** 
(0.0299) 
 0.2280*** 
(0.0030) 
0.2298*** 
(0.0031) 
0.2236*** 
(0.0096) 
 0.0002*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0002*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0002*** 
(0.0000) 
Dependentit-
1 
 0.3294*** 
(0.0155) 
0.3360*** 
(0.0161) 
0.2210*** 
(0.0545) 
 0.0188* 
(0.0098) 
0.0193 
(0.0102) 
0.0011 
(0.0321) 
 0.1092*** 
(0.0046) 
0.1058*** 
(0.0049) 
0.1082*** 
(0.0169) 
Dependent2it  -0.9314*** 
(0.0248) 
-0.9437*** 
(0.0259) 
-0.8088*** 
(0.0860) 
 -0.5026*** 
(0.0123) 
-0.5145*** 
(0.0129) 
-0.4722*** 
(0.0395) 
 -0.0005 
(0.0005) 
-0.0005 
(0.0005) 
-0.0003 
(0.0008) 
LERNERjt-1  -0.0311* 
(0.0204) 
-0.0412* 
(0.0215) 
-0.0764* 
(0.0645) 
 -0.0452*** 
(0.0074) 
-0.0438*** 
(0.0079) 
-0.0798*** 
(0.0226) 
 -0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
LERNERjt-2  -0.0659*** 
(0.0208) 
-0.0610*** 
(0.0220) 
-0.1153* 
(0.0614) 
 -0.0534*** 
(0.0067) 
-0.0526*** 
(0.0071) 
-0.0364 
(0.0202) 
 -0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
LERNERjt-3  0.2396*** 
(0.0215) 
0.2309*** 
(0.0229) 
0.3026*** 
(0.0603) 
 0.0323*** 
(0.0091) 
0.0338*** 
(0.0097) 
-0.0083 
(0.0268) 
 0.0000* 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
LERNERjt-4  0.1108*** 
(0.0287) 
0.1061*** 
(0.0305) 
0.1441* 
(0.0807) 
 0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
 0.0000* 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
0.0000 
(0.0000) 
(CF/K)it-1  0.0941*** 
(0.0046) 
0.0969*** 
(0.0049) 
0.0724*** 
(0.0130) 
 0.0097*** 
(0.0015) 
0.0094*** 
(0.0015) 
0.0115** 
(0.0041) 
 0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 
(Y/K)it-1  0.0290*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0289*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0265*** 
(0.0015) 
 0.0016*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0016*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0013*** 
(0.0004) 
 0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 
(B/K)2it-1  -0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0002*** 
(0.0000) 
 -0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
 -0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
GDPht  0.6696*** 
(0.1810) 
0.7813*** 
(0.1937) 
0.1098 
(0.5270) 
 0.8499*** 
(0.0726) 
0.8393*** 
(0.0772) 
1.0511*** 
(0.2168) 
 0.0004*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0004*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
MAjt   -0.0284*** 
(0.0075) 
-0.0298*** 
(0.0077) 
-0.0012 
(0.0290) 
 -0.0042 
(0.0025) 
-0.0025 
(0.0026) 
-0.0029 
(0.0080) 
 -0.0000** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000* 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
Crisist  -0.0135* 
(0.0053) 
-0.0147** 
(0.0056) 
0.0079 
(0.0152) 
 -0.0810*** 
(0.0035) 
-0.0872*** 
(0.0038) 
-0.0256*** 
(0.0094) 
 -0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
Industry 
dummies 
 YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
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Regional 
dummies 
 YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Time 
dummies 
 YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Steady state  0.3778*** 
(0.0813) 
0.3533*** 
(0.0875) 
0.3272* 
(0.1867) 
 0.0027 
(0.0204) 
0.0128 
(0.0217) 
-0.0965 
(0.0540) 
 0.0001** 
(0.0000) 
0.0001** 
(0.0000) 
0.0001 
(0.0000) 
Obs  73,853 66,577 7,276  129,727 116,306 13,421  156,669 139,736 16,933 
Sargan test 
(p-value) 
 0.199 0.179 0.568  0.563 0.467 0.465  0.141 0.127 0.164 
m2  
(p-value) 
 0.391 0.601 0.503  0.454 0.175 0.194  0.514 0.549 0.087 
m3  
(p-value) 
 0.652 0.716 0.270  0.753 0.315 0.121  0.653 0.599 0.828 
Notes: *, **, *** statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. 
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Table 9: Granger Predictability Test 
 
Instrumental variable regression with fixed effects. Instrumented variable: Δ(CF/K)it. Instrumental 
variables: Δ(Sales/K)it-1 and Δ(EBIDTA/K)it-1 
Whole variables expressed in first differences. 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
 (I/K)it LERNERjt  (I/K)it HHIjt 
(I/K)it-1 -1.1834*** 
(0.0240) 
0.0062 
(0.0063) 
 -1.1863*** 
(0.0231) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
(I/K)it-2 -1.2619*** 
(0.0212) 
0.0069 
(0.0055) 
 -1.2659*** 
(0.0211) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
(I/K)it-3 -1.1692*** 
(0.0186) 
0.0048 
(0.0046) 
 -1.1727*** 
(0.0203) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
(I/K)it-4 -0.9725*** 
(0.0171) 
0.0049 
(0.0038) 
 -0.9830*** 
(0.0185) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
MARKET 
POWERjt-1 
0.1618*** 
(0.0503) 
-1.0365*** 
(0.1024) 
 -0.0161 
(0.4772) 
-0.8301*** 
(0.0109) 
MARKET 
POWERjt-2 
0.2835*** 
(0.0896) 
-1.1926*** 
(0.1031) 
 0.2008 
(0.4774) 
-0.8224*** 
(0.0071) 
MARKET 
POWERjt-3 
0.6861*** 
(0.0660) 
-1.8909*** 
(0.0467) 
 2.6591*** 
(0.3474) 
-0.4875*** 
(0.0068) 
MARKET 
POWERjt-4 
0.8228*** 
(0.0710) 
-2.4157*** 
(0.1108) 
 -2.3555** 
(0.8215) 
-0.5721*** 
(0.0214) 
(CF/K)it -0.0032 
(0.1003) 
0.0112 
(0.0220) 
 -0.0260 
(0.0853) 
0.0005 
(0.0003) 
(Y/K)it 0.0027 
(0.0042) 
-0.0005 
(0.0009) 
 0.0037 
(0.0035) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
(B/K) 2it -0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
 -0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 
GDPht 3.3549** 
(1.2191) 
11.2628*** 
(1.4282) 
 0.6338* 
(0.3615) 
0.0723*** 
(0.0035) 
MAjt -0.0033* 
(0.0057) 
0.0763*** 
(0.0138) 
 -0.0016 
(0.0059) 
0.0014** 
(0.0005) 
Crisist 0.0193 
(0.0101) 
-0.0449*** 
(0.0137) 
 0.0559*** 
(0.0040) 
0.0010*** 
(0.0001) 
Industry 
dummies YES YES  YES YES 
Regional 
dummies YES YES  YES YES 
Time dummies YES YES  YES YES 
Cluster Region Region  Region Region 
      
Obs 97,159 99,096  106,213 108,394 
R2 0.207 0.415  0.194 0.821 
F-test (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
Hansen J test  
(p-value) 0.1315 0.6781  0.4523 0.2318 
Endogeneity 
test  
(p-value) 
0.7894 0.3938  0.8874 0.7976 
Notes: *, **, *** statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively 
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Table 10: Robustness check. The impact of bank market concentration (HHI) on firm investment, 1998-2009. 
Standard errors in parentheses (White (1980) heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors). 
Arellano and Bond (1991) dynamic panel data regression. 
  (I/K)it.    (ΔAit/Ait-1)  (I/A)it 
  Complete 
sample SME Large firms  
Complete 
sample SME Large firms  
Complete 
sample SME Large firms 
Intercept  0.2701*** 
(0.0111) 
0.2762*** 
(0.0119) 
0.1923*** 
(0.0371)  
0.1996*** 
(0.0040) 
0.1990*** 
(0.0042) 
0.2130*** 
(0.0128)  
0.0002*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0002*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0002*** 
(0.0000) 
Dependentit-
1 
 0.3376*** 
(0.0145) 
0.3436*** 
(0.0151) 
0.2252*** 
(0.0517)  
0.0263*** 
(0.0085) 
0.0322*** 
(0.0089) 
0.0202 
(0.0272)  
0.1154*** 
(0.0044) 
0.1120*** 
(0.0047) 
0.1124*** 
(0.0163) 
Dependent2it  -0.9422*** 
(0.0234) 
-0.9552*** 
(0.0243) 
-0.8039*** 
(0.0823)  
-0.0263*** 
(0.0085) 
-0.0322*** 
(0.0089) 
-0.0202 
(0.0272)  
-0.0005 
(0.0005) 
-0.0005 
(0.0005) 
-0.0003 
(0.0007) 
HHIjt-1  -0.6129*** 
(0.2228) 
-0.5760** 
(0.2376) 
-0.6005 
(0.6718)  
-0.0344 
(0.1195) 
-0.0712 
(0.1265) 
-0.0312 
(0.3608)  
-0.0004*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0004*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0001 
(0.0004) 
HHIjt-2  -0.4554** 
(0.2235) 
-0.4240* 
(0.2370) 
-0.3336 
(0.6672)  
-0.3603*** 
(0.1064) 
-0.3315** 
(0.1121) 
-0.5347 
(0.3344)  
-0.0008*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0007*** 
(0.0001) 
-0.0006* 
(0.0003) 
HHIjt-3  1.1519*** 
(0.4372) 
1.1629*** 
(0.4875) 
1.5257 
(0.9270)  
0.4599*** 
(0.1077) 
0.4955*** 
(0.1160) 
0.3357 
(0.2812)  
0.0003*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0004*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0002 
(0.0003) 
HHIjt-4  1.1264*** 
(0.3143) 
1.0715*** 
(0.3399) 
1.3114 
(0.7602)  
0.0305 
(0.0992) 
0.0532 
(0.1054) 
0.3817 
(0.2870)  
0.0004*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0003*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0003 
(0.0003) 
(CF/K)it-1  0.0942*** 
(0.0044) 
0.0972*** 
(0.0047) 
0.0678*** 
(0.0124)  
0.0035*** 
(0.0013) 
0.0029* 
(0.0014) 
0.0070 
(0.0038)  
0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 
(Y/K)it-1  0.0292*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0292*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0266*** 
(0.0015)  
0.0011*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0010*** 
(0.0001) 
0.0012** 
(0.0004)  
0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 
(B/K)2it-1  -0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0002*** 
(0.0000)  
-0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000** 
(0.0000)  
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
GDPht  0.5258*** 
(0.0806) 
0.5934*** 
(0.0874) 
0.1824 
(0.2291)  
1.7627*** 
(0.0360) 
1.8345*** 
(0.0383) 
1.4279*** 
(0.1112)  
0.0004*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0004*** 
(0.0000) 
0.0005*** 
(0.0001) 
MAjt   -0.0219*** 
(0.0073) 
-0.0233*** 
(0.0075) 
0.0083 
(0.0292)  
-0.0036 
(0.0025) 
-0.0024 
(0.0026) 
-0.0143 
(0.0081)  
-0.0000** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000* 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000 
(0.0000) 
Crisisit  -0.0052* 
(0.0033) 
-0.0058* 
(0.0035) 
0.0048 
(0.0102)  
-0.0439*** 
(0.0015) 
-0.0431*** 
(0.0015) 
-0.0280*** 
(0.0051)  
-0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0000*** 
(0.0000) 
Industry 
dummies 
 YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Regional 
dummies 
 YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
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Time 
dummies 
 YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
Steady state  1.8265
* 
(0.9897) 
1.8808* 
(1.0968) 
2.4563 
(2.0729) 
 0.0982 
(0.2401) 
0.1509 
(0.1963) 
0.1547 
(0.6977) 
 -0.0004 
(0.0004) 
-0.0004 
(0.0004) 
-0.0002 
(0.0006) 
Obs  84,123 75,925 8,198  171,317 152,815 18,502  170,045 151,694 18,351 
Wald test 
(p-value) 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Sargan test 
(p-value) 
 0.233 0.207 0.207  0.135 0.121 0.150  0.292 0.372 0.346 
m1 (p-value)  0.133 0.447 0.636  0.619 0.647 0.120  0.198 0.565 0.649 
m2 (p-value)  0.426 0.813 0.037  0.844 0.778 0.017  0.369 0.674 0.172 
Notes: *, **, *** statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. 
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Appendix A: Computing the Lerner index. 
The computation of the marginal cost ( ) of the Lerner index given in expression (11) 
is based on the specification of the following translog cost function: 
 (16) 
where Cjt is a bank’s total cost (financial and operating costs), TAjt is total assets, and wjt 
the cost of inputs (labour, capital, and the cost of deposits). We include the variable Trend 
to control for technological changes over time. A system of factor demand (share) 
equations is derived, according to Shephard’s lemma, as: 
 
                                            (17) 
where mhjt is the cost share of factor h for bank j in period t. 
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